A member of the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) stands near a poster of jailed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan in the grounds of their base deep in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region on May 5, 2014. The Kurdistan Region’s recent announcement of a referendum on independence may upset Iran’s policies in the region.(SAFIN HAMED/AFP/Getty Images)
The collapse of Baghdad’s authority in northern and western Iraq, together with the occupation of Kirkuk by Peshmerga fighters, has shortened the odds of Iraqi Kurdistan declaring independence in the minds of many observers. The declaration at the start of July by President Massoud Barzani of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that the autonomous territory should begin planning for a referendum on the matter has raised expectations further.
No one really knows if Barzani is serious about pushing for independence. Iranian officials, however, seem to be genuinely concerned about such a prospect, though the question remains whether Tehran can do anything to influence Barzani’s next steps.
There are those in Tehran who see Barzani as merely playing a political game with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. They believe that Barzani is not genuinely aiming for independence, and instead is merely talking up the idea as a way of gaining concessions from Baghdad in the form of more territory and more political influence for the Kurds in Iraq’s central government.
Others in Tehran fear that Barzani is committed to Kurdish independence and that he believes now is the best time to go for it, in light of the fluid circumstances in both Iraq and the wider Middle East. In response, two weeks ago the Iranian deputy foreign minister in charge of regional issues, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, felt it necessary to publicly warn that Iraq’s Kurds should “face reality,” and that “all Iraqi factions should respect the country’s constitution” to prevent the country from breaking up.
Perhaps it is also time for the Iranians to face some hard realities about the unraveling of Iraq—and whether Tehran is in a position to stop it should the Iraqi conflict result in the country’s de facto partition. Historically, Iran has always been against the creation of an independent Kurdish state. That was the position of the pro-American Shah of Iran, just as it has been the policy of the Islamic Republic since it came into being in 1979. Iran has its own restive Kurdish minority of some 7 million people.
From Tehran’s perspective, an independent Kurdish state next door is likely to incite Iranian Kurds, many of whom have a longstanding sense of grievance against the central government in Tehran. In fact, a limited and localized anti-government insurgency against the Iranian state by militant Iranian Kurds—groups such as the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan, known by the acronym PJAK—has been a feature of Iranian politics for years.
Increasingly, however, the authorities in Tehran are also concerned that Kurdish independence under Barzani would be tantamount to a diplomatic victory for Iran’s regional rival, Turkey. Barzani is close to Ankara, and the Turkish government has lately proven to be remarkably accepting of the idea of Kurdish independence. As with the Iranians, Turkey has also historically opposed such a state, but Barzani’s Kurdistan Region in Iraq now has such strong political and economic ties to Turkey that Turkish reservations have apparently softened considerably.
Given that the Iranians are already deeply mired in assisting its allies in Damascus and Baghdad, it is unlikely that Tehran would opt for an overt and aggressive strategy to derail Barzani’s bid for independence should he and his cohorts in Erbil choose to make a serious push for it. Instead, Tehran will most likely seek to nurture those Iraqi Kurds who are openly opposed to Barzani’s plans. This would include elements within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan —the historic rival to Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party. After all, the preferred Iranian modus operandi to secure its regional interests is to first identify local partners that share its goals and where tactical alliances can be made. There is, however, no doubt that the challenge posed by the prospect of Kurdish independence has just become more daunting for Tehran.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
